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This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the 
OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential 
nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a “big bang” multilateral agreement. 
The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing 
down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This 
makes their “tax haven business” more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these 
remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their “tax haven business”. 
Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not 
eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD. 
JEL-Code: F21, H26, H77, H87. 








Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax Law 
Munich / Germany 
May.Elsayyad@ip.mpg.de 
Kai A. Konrad 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax Law 
Department of Public Economics 
Marstallplatz 1 





September 14, 2010 
We thank Wolfgang Schön, Johannes Becker and Eckhard Janeba for valuable comments. 
The usual caveat applies. May Elsayyad gratefully acknowledges financial support from the 
German Science Foundation (DFG) through GRK 801. 
1 Introduction
The OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition (1998, p. 23) worked out a
number of factors that may be used for identifying tax havens. One of these
factors is existing national bank secrecy rules, which have been utilized to
support tax haven activities. Such rules protect investors "against scrutiny
by tax authorities, thereby prevening the e¤ective exchange of information
on taxpayers beneting from the low tax jurisdiction" and e¤ectively enable
investors to avoid paying the respective capital income taxes in their country
of residence. In response to this phenomenon, several initiatives have been
launched against tax havens by the OECD, the G8, the United Nations O¢ ce
for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and the European Union, since the
1990s.
Most prominent is the 1998 OECD initiative subsequently known as the
Harmful Tax Practices Initiative, which was intended to discourage the use
of preferential tax regimes for foreign investors and to encourage e¤ective
information exchange among the tax authorities of di¤erent countries. As
part of the initiative, the OECD produced a list of countries and territo-
ries that it deemed to be tax havens. Starting out from this confrontational
stance, over the years OECD attitudes with regards to tax havens shifted
from confrontational to cooperative. OECD and non-OECD countries have
worked together to develop mutual standards of transparency and exchange
of information, which have come to serve as a model for a vast majority of
the 3600 bilateral tax conventions entered into by the OECD and non-OECD
countries and may now be considered as the international norm for tax co-
operation.1 Many, but not all of the 1998 listed and identied havens have
agreed over time to improve the transparency of their tax systems and to fa-
cilitate information exchange, and if this information exchange is su¢ ciently
e¤ective, this essentially would close down the respective countrys activities
as a tax haven. The dynamic process of implementation of these agreements,
however, has been rather slow.2 Between 2000 and the London Summit Dec-
laration in 2009, only 100 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs)
1See Kudrle (2008)
2Furthermore, limited evidence does not suggest any impact of the OECD initiative
on tax-haven activity. Kudrle (2008) examines total foreign portfolio investment in the
Cayman Islands and in a broader set of tax-haven countries. His time-series analysis nds
no signicant impact of the OECD initiative. This supports the notion that the OECD
initiative has not been implemented in practice to any meaningful extent.
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had been signed between OECD countries and the nancial centers; further-
more, these signings for the most part have been limited to a small number
of countries. Despite the surge in TIEA signings which has taken place in
the months after the London Summit, it is evident that the ght against
tax havens has followed a sequential pattern.3 Once general guidelines had
been established, not all agreements were made simultaneously. Also they
were not conditioned on each other. The agreements emerged as successive
independent decisions, followed by a sequential implementation process.
Our analysis focuses on this aspect of sequentiality compared to a simulta-
neous approach, or rather a simultaneous coordinated approach of e¤ectively
closing down tax haven activity (i.e., by enforcing appropriate information
exchange institutions that remove the implementation process). In particu-
lar, a tax havens decision to comply with OECD rules and, e¤ectively, give
up its business as a tax shelter for residents in high-tax countries has im-
plications for other tax havensbusiness opportunities and their incentives
on whether to also comply with OECD rules. Tax havens, while providing
capital concealment opportunities for mobile capital, also compete with each
other for this capital. Now if the vast majority of competitors exits the tax
haven business, this a¤ects equilibrium behavior of both the residence coun-
tries of investors who use tax havens and of the tax haven business. This has
implications for the equilibrium payo¤s of residence countries and of the tax
havens that remain active. Our analysis focuses on these market interactions,
and the role of sequentiality of the ght against tax havens for welfare in the
non-haven countries and for the market structure that is likely to emerge.
We show that a sequential process of closing down the tax haven business
of one tax haven country after the other is particularly costly, compared to
a simultaneous, all-in-one approach. This is particularly true if the agenda
setter who engages in the process of closing down tax havens were able to
commit to a strategy of conditionality, linking the decisions of all tax havens.
The OECD and other supranational entities engaged in the ght against tax
havens may not have the option of an all-in-one approach. But for this case
our analysis reveals a hidden cost of the sequential process that is not obvious
from the outset. Furthermore, we show that given a sequential implemen-
tation pattern, from the perspective of the overall cost, it is less costly to
approach larger havens rst. A nding which does not correspond to the
3The initiative has remained concentrated on a small number of countries and the
general characteristics of the signatories remain more or less unchanged.
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pattern of recent TIEA signings, which have mainly concentrated on smaller
havens.
The public nance literature on tax havens has generated many insights
into the role of tax havens and the functioning of tax competition in a world
with tax havens. Despite the fact that the bulk of the tax haven literature
has concentrated on the welfare implications of corporate tax planning and
avoidance, a general consensus on the ramication of the existence of tax
havens for corporations has not been reached. A widespread view argues
that havens erode the tax base of high-tax countries and thus exacerbate
the e¤ects of tax competition. The positive view of tax havens, however,
purports that tax havens enable high-tax countries to impose lower e¤ective
tax rates on highly mobile rms, while taxing immobile rms more heav-
ily. The standard view underlying the OECD initiative is that tax havens
may strengthen tax competition and erode the tax revenues of non-tax-haven
countries.4 Some of the literature also reveals possible countervailing e¤ects
suggesting that tax havens may actually provide benets as well.5 A diver-
sity of views exists that is surveyed by Dharmapala (2008). However, this
literature basically takes tax havens (typically one) as a given.6
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) while taking a negative view on tax havens
and accounting for the existence of multiple tax havens and tax haven ghting
expenditures, come to di¤erent conclusions as aspects of competition between
tax havens, as well as specic anti-tax-haven initiatives are not specically
considered. To our knowledge the tax haven literature disregards the role of
competition and market concentration between tax havens and the change
in competition that emerges from the OECD policy that tries to change the
set of tax havens. It is exactly this e¤ect which needs to be taken into
consideration in the process of closing down tax haven operations, however.
The competition e¤ect of forced exit in a framework with multiple, competing
tax havens turns out to be most important for an assessment of the cost and
benets of the current OECD policy.7
4A formal analysis along these lines is provided by Slemrod and Wilson (2009). For an
analysis focusing on the harmful e¤ects for developing countries see, Torvik (2009).
5See, e.g., Hong and Smart (2010), Desai et al. (2006) and Johannesen (2010).
6Slemrod (2008) provides an empirical analysis of the possible factors (including income,
literacy, development aid, size or whether a country is an island) that make it more
or less likely that a country engages in activities as a tax haven (following the OECD
classication).
7While considerable research has taken place to understand the economics of bilateral
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For a description of competition between tax havens we adopt the formal
structure of Bertrand markets with subsets of price sensitive and loyal or un-
informed consumers, building on the fundamental insights of Varian (1980).
More specically, for this competition between tax havens we rely on the
competition model by Narasimhan (1988).8 This market structure is su¢ -
ciently general to map a whole continuum of competition regimes, ranging
from local monopolies to cut-throat Bertrand competition, and it is suit-
able to consider the competition and market concentration e¤ects stemming
from policies that inactivate tax-haven activities of a subset of tax havens.
The implications of these changes in market concentration for a simultaneous
or sequential inactivation of tax havens are the main drivers of our results.
Changes in market concentration play a major role in many other areas of
international economics. Merger or exit by some competitors in a given mar-
ket generates externalities to other competitors and also inuences others
merger or exit decisions.9 These e¤ects have been explored along a large
variety of dimensions. Examples in contexts such as strategic trade policy,
outsourcing, and other policy areas are Dixit (1984), Horn and Levinsohn
(2001), Lommerud et al. (2006) and Norbäck et al. (2009). In our frame-
work the change in market concentration is caused by one player who governs
the possible exit or inactivation of some of his competitors and who antic-
ipates that the induced exit of a competitor may change the opportunities
and cost of inactivating further competitors.
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the model frame-
work. In sections 3 and 4 we solve for the equilibria of the multi-stage game.
Section 5 compares the di¤erent results and their implications, and concludes.
versus multilateral trade agreements, see for example Bagwell and Staiger (2004), research
involving bilateral tax treaties has mainly focused on their investment e¤ects between
high-tax countries, see Chisik and Davies (2004).
8This competition model is extended in multiple directions in Industrial Organization
and has become a "workhorse model", similar to the standard Cournot or Bertrand frame-
work, and many competition modes are nested in this framework. In the eld of public
nance, the modications of this competition model have been used by Wang (2004),
Andersson and Konrad (2001), Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and Marceau et al. (2010).
9The externalities of merger often make it more attractive to be an outsider than to
participate in a merger, which leads to the question of endogenous merger. See Horn and
Persson (2001) for a discussion and a possible approach. In our framework this endogeneity
is not an issue as a strong player governs the process of tax haven inactivation here.
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2 The structure of the problem
We consider a game with three players: One player is the government in the
country that engages in ghting tax havens (or, for that purpose, the OECD).
We call this player S. Residents in S are the sole owners of nancial capital.
The other two players are tax havens, denoted H1 and H2; which seek to
attract mobile capital by o¤ering concealment services. Depending on the
tax rate on capital income in S, whether the tax havens are active, and
the terms which the tax havens o¤er for their services, nancial capital can
allocate between S;H1 and H2.
We consider the following multi-stage game:
In Phase 1 - the haven deactivation phase - actions by S, H1 and H2
determine whether no, one or two tax havens will be available for investors.
In intuitive terms, in this phase the government of S may buy out one or
both tax havens. This means, country S may o¤er to compensate the tax
haven in exchange for its promise to discontinue its tax haven business -
meaning that they fully cooperate with S regarding information exchange.
This essentially allows for the full implementation of the residence principle
on capital income, and leads to a situation in which H1; H2 or both would
become useless as havens. The assumption by which S compensates the
tax havens to terminate their operation rather than threatening them with
retaliatory actions that are costly for the country that carries them out is
mainly for analytical simplicity and clarity.10
We distinguish between two di¤erent types of o¤ers made. One of these
regimes is seen as a possible option that is currently not pursued. The other
regime maps more closely the current OECD initiative.
Simultaneous joint o¤er : Country S may o¤er payments b1  0 and
b2  0 to the two tax havens H1 and H2, respectively. S is able to commit
to either pay both amounts or none, and to make this payment dependent
on whether both havens agree. Tax havens then simultaneously and inde-
pendently declare whether they would be willing to accept this o¤er. This
declaration requires some ability to commit. Each tax haven commits to
close down in exchange for receiving the payment, but continues to operate
if no payment is received. Accordingly, if both agree, then S makes both
10It is clear that any punishment threat is costly for S as well, and that it causes a
di¤erential in payo¤ for the tax haven between being punished and not beeing punished.
Unlike a simple compensation that we consider, the cost and this di¤erential need not be
of equal size.
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payments. If payments are made, both tax havens go out of business. If
only one tax haven declares agreement or if none of the tax havens declares
agreement, then no money is paid out and both tax havens remain active,
and we move to Phase 2 of the game with two active tax havens.
Sequential o¤ers: Country S may rst o¤er a payment bi to one of the
tax havens Hi. This tax haven has to decide whether to accept this o¤er and
to become inactive in phase 2, or to remain active. Based on this outcome
country S may o¤er a payment b i to the other tax haven, H i. The choice
of making this o¤er, and the payment chosen, typically will depend on the
outcome of the rst o¤er made, and on whether it has been accepted or not.
Also, whether the tax haven H i accepts or rejects this o¤er can generally be
dependent on the rst o¤er made and whether it has been accepted or not.
We assume that the havens accept the o¤er if they are indi¤erent between
accepting or rejecting. This ends Phase 1.
At the beginning of Phase 2 -the competition phase- the set of active tax
havens is either fH1; H2g, fH1g, fH2g or ?. S rst chooses a tax rate t that
applies to nancial capital invested in country S. This tax rate is from a
closed interval [0; r]. The upper end of this interval is exogenously given and
reects institutional or political conditions in country S. This tax has to be
paid by each unit of nancial capital that will locate in S. Tax havens that
are active (that is, tax havens that have not accepted or received an o¤er by
S in Phase 1) can then choose proportional user fees p1 2 [0; r] and p2 2 [0; r]
that also apply to each unit of nancial capital that will be invested in the
respective tax haven. In exchange for the fee they guarantee the investor full
secrecy as regards his or her capital income.11 We assume that investors can
fully rely on this promise. Hence, investors save the residence income tax t
on this capital income.
Once the conditions for investment are known, the nancial capital is
allocated between S; H1 andH2 as a function of the tax t and, if the respective
tax haven is active, the user fees pi for i 2 f1; 2g in the active tax havens.
We do not explicitly model the investors as players. The total amount of
11Typically, these fees are paid to the nancial service industry that operates in the tax
haven, rather than to the government of the tax haven directly. If the nancial market in-
side a tax haven is a competitive market, however, these fees are essentially determined by
licence fees and charges which the tax haven collects from the local rms or local branches
operating in this sector. A more disaggregated framework with a competitive nancial
services sector in each tax haven would require further notation and yields analogous
results.
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nancial capital is normalized to 1, and is owned by residents of country
S. There are three di¤erent types of nancial capital. A share s of this
nancial capital is immobile. This is the share of capital owned by residents
who cannot, or would never like to invest their nancial capital o¤shore and
simply pay whatever is the tax rate in country S. Shares hi of capital are
mobile only between S and one of the respective tax haven Hi for i 2 f1; 2g.
The share hi of nancial capital is invested in Hi if and only if pi  t.12
This assumption corresponds to the notion that some investors may have an
a¢ nity for particular tax haven countries. This a¢ nity could, for instance,
be based on geographical proximity, language, a convenient legal code etc.
Finally, there is a remaining amount of nancial capital that is perfectly
mobile. This amount is denoted by  = 1  s  h1   h2.  stays in S if t is
smaller than pi for all tax havens that are active. It moves to a tax haven
rather than staying in S if the user fee in one of the active tax havens is at
least as low as the tax. If both tax havens are active and the user fees in both
tax havens are not higher than t, this capital locates to the tax haven with
the lower user fee, and if both tax havens are active and p1 = p2  t, equal
shares of this fully mobile capital locate to each of the two tax havens.13
Capital yields the same gross return, independent of where it is located
(which is a natural assumption in case of a well integrated international
capital market). And it does not restrict generality if we normalize this
return to zero, i.e., assume that one unit of nancial investment turns into
one unit of gross nancial return, and -as is common in the tax competition
literature- consider taxes and fees on capital, rather than on its returns.
Finally, we need to specify the payo¤s of S, H1 and H2. Each tax haven
maximizes the sum of user fees pi and payments bi received from S. An active
tax haven does not receive any payment from S and its payo¤ equals its user
fees, which is equal to the product of pi and the amount of nancial capital
xi that is invested in this tax haven, where the xis are generally functions
of t and pi, and of whether the other tax haven is active. This is considered
in more detail further below.
The payo¤ of country S is less straightforward. The benevolent govern-
12For pi = t this is the natural tie-breaking assumption, given that S chooses t prior to
the tax havenschoices of fees.
13Note that the capital owners are not strategic players here. They simply invest their
capital where the cost of investment is smallest for them. This avoids measurability
problems of dealing with a continuum of players and is essentially a technical simplication
of the problem.
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ment in country S maximizes
S = (1  t)(1  x1   x2) + (1  p1)x1 + (1  p2)x2 (1)
+(1 + )t(1  x1   x2)  (1 + )(1b1 + 2b2)
This payo¤ consists of several terms. The rst term in (1) is the net-of-tax
return on domestically invested capital. The second and third term represent
the capital incomes of residents net of user fees p1x1 and p2x2 paid on the
amounts x1 and x2 that result from the nancial assets shifted o¤shore to
the two tax havens H1 and H2. The fourth term is the social valuation of
the capital tax revenue. This is equal to the product of (1 + ) and the tax
revenue. The tax revenue is equal to t times the amount of nancial capital
that locates to S. The factor (1 + ) accounts for the fact that government
revenue has a shadow price (1 + ) that exceeds unity by  > 0, due to
the excess burden of taxation from other revenue sources. The last term is
the social cost of possible payments b1 and b2 that are o¤ered to the tax
havens. These depend on whether the tax havens accept these payments (for
becoming inactive). Here, 1 and 1 are indicator variables that are equal to
1 and 0 , depending on whether or not the payments are accepted and made.
We will assume that this payo¤ function applies for S:
To solve the di¤erent variants of this game we use the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium. We start with solving for the set of equilibria in phase
2 for di¤erent combinations of active tax havens.
3 Equilibrium in Phase 2
If both tax havens are active Country S chooses t prior to the tax
havenschoices of p1 and p2. Consider the payo¤ of Hi for a given t and pj:
Hi = pixi =
8>><>>:
0 if pi > t




pi if pi = p i  t
pihi if t  pi > p i
(2)
for i; i 2 f1; 2g. A choice of pi > t will render the haven zero prots. For
pi  t, if Hi o¤ers lower user fees pi than its haven competitor, it attracts its
partially mobile capital segment hi and the price sensitive segment . If it
o¤ers its services for a fee pi that is higher than its haven competitor, then
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it attracts only its partially mobile capital segment. If the two havens set
the same level of user fees, then each gets its partially mobile segment, while
the price sensitive  segment is equally divided between the two havens.
A few considerations limit the range of possible equilibrium choices of
fees in the tax havens. First, by (2) tax havens will never choose pi > t for
t > 0. A price pi > t implies zero payo¤, and setting any other price level
lower than or equal to t would ensure higher haven prots than 0. Also, while
competing for the price sensitive mobile segment ; havens will never set a





The reason for this is as follows. The haven Hi has a "default" option: by
setting pi = t tax haven Hi can obtain a prot which cannot fall below thi,
irrespective of the other tax havens choice. The maximum payo¤ obtainable
from a pi < t is pi (hi + ) and this maximum is obtained if, choosing this
fee, the haven succeeds in capturing the whole price-sensitive mobile segment
. Note that, by h1 > h2 ; it follows that p^1 > p^2. But given that p1  p^1,
H2 does not choose p2 < p^1, as such a price is dominated by a price closer
to p^1. This narrows down the range of possible fees chosen in an equilibrium
to the interval [p^1; t]. Note further that, for any given t 2 (0; r], there is no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.14 Intuitively, haven Hi has an incentive
to undercut haven H is user fee by a very small amount in regions in which
prices are above the oor p^1, as this lures the whole mobile segment  to
Hi. And p1 = p2 = p^1 is also not an equilibrium, as, from there, deviations
towards pi = t pay for at least one player.
The competition between tax havens for a given t is structurally equiv-
alent to Bertrand competition between two rms with loyal customers as in
Narasimhan (1988), and we can use his results on existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium and its characterization. A unique equilibrium exists and
lies in mixed strategies. In this equilibrium each haven picks its price inde-
14To conrm this, suppose that (p1; p

2) 2 [p^1; r] [p^1; r] is such an equilibrium. Note
that p1 and p

2 cannot be mutually optimal replies if p

1 > p^1 and p

2 > p^1. Suppose they
are, and let pi  p i. Then  i could increase its payo¤ by moving to pi    for su¢ ciently
small but positive . Note next that p1 and p

2 cannot be mutually optimal replies if
minfp1; p2g = p^1. Two cases need to be distinguished. If p1 = p2 = p^1 then Haven 1 can
do better by choosing p1 = r. If pi > p

 i = p^1, then  i can do better by increasing its
price by half the di¤erence between pi and p

 i. This shows that the claim of existence of
a pure strategy equilibrium leads to a contradiction.
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pendently and randomly according to a cumulative distribution function Fi
for i = (1; 2) with support [p^1; t]; with haven H1 having a mass point at t.
The following lemma describes the havenspayo¤s in this equilibrium.
Lemma 1 (Narasimhan (1988)) For t > 0 there exists a unique equilibrium
of the subgame between two active havens.15 The equilibrium is in mixed
strategies with expected payo¤s
E(1) = h1t for H1 and E(2) =
h1t
h1 + 
(h2 + ) for H2. (4)
A feature of the equilibrium in the competition between tax havens is that
the haven H1 with the larger partially mobile segment earns the same prot
in equilibrium that it would earn if it were to set p1 = t with probability 1,
whereas the havenH2 with the smaller hi segment earns h1t (h2 + ) = (h1 + ) ;
which is higher than the prot h2t that H2 could make if it focused on its
partially mobile segment. Hence, this tax havens prot is positive even if it
has no own partially mobile capital segment, i.e., for h2 = 0.
The competition framework used here has several advantages. First, it is
su¢ ciently general to have many standard cases as special cases. Suppose,
for instance, that h1 = h2  h. Then the equilibrium is symmetric. Both tax
havens would earn the same payo¤ th. For h = 0 this payo¤becomes equal to
zero, as this is the case of Bertrand competition for a perfectly homogenous
product and without loyal customers. Also, if the fully price-sensitive share
 converges towards zero, then both tax havens simply charge the monopoly
price as the pure equilibrium strategy. Second, the framework has the advan-
tage of providing uniquely determined payo¤s in the competition subgame.
Narasimhan (1988) proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium. This allows us
to consider a contracted game in which we can replace the subgame by the
unique equilibrium payo¤s of this last stage.
Using the results from Lemma 1, we can also calculate the payo¤ of
country S as a function of t, assuming subgame perfect equilibrium play
among the tax havens. The payo¤ of S is
1  st  h1t  h1t
h1 + 
(h2 + ) + (1 + ) ts (5)
15For completeness we report the cumulative distribution functions characterizing the
equilibrium. These are F1(p) = F2(p) = 0 for p < h1t=(h1t+ ); F1 = 1 + h2   h1t(h2+)p(h1+)
and F2 = 1  h1(t p)p for h1th1t+  p  t and F1 = F2 = 1 for p > t.
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Note that, for any t > 0, one or both of the tax havens attract the mobile
tax base. Hence, welfare of the country consists of investorsexpected net
returns plus (1+) times the tax revenue, minus (1+) times the payments
for closing down tax havens (zero in this case, as both tax havens are active -
compared to (1)). The immobile capital (quantity s) stays in country S. All
other capital is invested in the equilibrium in one or the other tax haven for
t 2 (0; r]. The expected fees collected by the tax havens are equal to their
expected payo¤s, and are generally a function of t. The investorsreturns
from investing in the tax havens is reduced by these expected payo¤s.
Country S maximizes (5) with respect to t. This yields the following
result.
Proposition 1 (i) Let  > [1 + h2+
h1+
](h1=s). In the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the continuation game with two active tax havens, S chooses t = r.
The expected equilibrium prots of the tax havens and of S are :
E(1) = h1r and




E(S) = 1 + rs  h1r   h1rh1+ (h2 + )
(6)
(ii) Let  < [1 + h2+
h1+
](h1=s). Then the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
continuation game with two active tax havens is described by t = 0, E(1) =
E(2) = 0 and E(S) = 1.
Proof. Consider Ss optimal choice t from the interval [0; r] of feasible tax
rates, anticipating equilibrium play in the continuation game for any given
choice of t. The countrys objective is to maximize
1 + ts  h1t  h1t
h1 + 
(h2 + ) (7)
The gradient of the expression in (7) with respect to t is
@E(s)
@t
= s  h1   h1
h1 + 
(h2 + ) , (8)








payo¤ of S is maximal for the maximum feasible t, which is t = r. The
equilibrium payo¤s in (6) follow from t = r, Lemma 1 and from inserting
t = r into the payo¤ function (5) for S.
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For  smaller than this threshold, the optimal choice of the tax rate is,
therefore, the smallest possible tax rate, t = 0. In this case any possible
choice of p1 and p2 yields the same payo¤s (of zero) for both tax havens, and
S = 1 by (5). Note also that there is a multiplicity of equilibria for t = 0,
as all pi and pj lead to the same payo¤s. The (unique) equilibrium for t > 0
converges towards the equilibrium with p1 = p2 = 0 for t = 0 at the limit.
But in any case, all the equilibria have the same payo¤s for all players.
Intuitively, given that the two tax havens choose their fees p1 and p2 for
hosting capital after t is chosen, they will always attract all of the price-
sensitive mobile capital. As S takes these equilibrium choices of the two
active tax havens into account, only the immobile capital remains in S, re-
gardless of the choice of t. This means that the tax base in S at equilibrium
remains una¤ected by changes in p1 and p2: Consequently, it is the shadow
price of public funds, ; which determines whether the government is willing
to set the tax rate equal to 0 or to the maximum rate. The threshold value
is










s ( + h1)
2
 





























(2 + h1 + h2) < 0; (13)
i.e., an increase in any of the mobile capital segments results in an increase
in ^, while an increase in s decreases the size of the critical shadow price of
public funds. Of course, none of h1, h2 ,  or s can change in isolation, as
they are connected through the budget constraint. However, the di¤erential
incidence can be calculated from the results (10) to (13) on partial incidence.
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If only one tax haven Hi is active Suppose only one tax haven Hi is
active. This changes the possible options for nancial capital. For the capital
hi that either locates to the active tax haven Hi or to S, and for the immobile
capital segment s the investment options do not change. The price-sensitive
capital segment  can now locate only in two locations, S or Hi. The capital
share hj that was mobile only between S and the now inactive Hj becomes
immobile: As Hj is no longer active, hj remains in S:
As Hj but not Hi is deactivated, a payment bj has been made, and no
payment has been made to Hi. Hence, j = 1 and i = 0 hold. Note that,
in the following section, the newly added superscripts to the payo¤ function
refer to the haven which has been deactivated. To di¤erentiate between the
possible regimes, we use the following notation for the payo¤of S: kS denotes
the payo¤ of S as a function of the regime, where superscript k = 0 refers to
the default state regime (both tax havens active), k = 1, k = 2 and k = 1; 2
refer to the regimes with i = 1 or i = 2 or i = 1 and i = 2 deactivated.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Hj has been deactivated due to a payment bj.
(i) If  > (hi + )=(s+ hj) then the subgame perfect equilibrium in Phase 2
is unique in payo¤s and characterized by pi = t = r with payo¤s:
ji = (hi + )r;
jj = bj and
jS = 1 + (s+ hj)r   (hi + )r   (1 + )bj:
(14)
(ii) If  < (hi+)=(s+hj) then the subgame perfect equilibrium in Phase
2 is unique and characterized by pi = t = 0, with payo¤s 
j
S = 1  (1 + )bj,
i = 0 and 
j
j = bj.
(iii) For  = (hi + )=(s+ hj) both equilibria exist.
Proof. Using backward induction, consider the last stage. The only active
tax haven Hi chooses pi for given t 2 [0; r] to maximize His payo¤ pixi,
with xi = 0 if pi > t and xi = 1   s   hj if pi 2 [0; t]. The solution of
this maximization problem is pi = t for all t  0 and yields a payo¤ of
(1  s  hj)t = ( + hi)t. For t > 0, the optimal pi is unique. For t = 0; all
possible pi yield the same payo¤ of zero. Turn next to the optimal choice of
t and take into consideration that at this stage bj is exogenously given and
that pi = t in the continuation game for t > 0. Country S maximizes
1  (s+ hj) t  (hi + ) t+ (1 + ) ((s+ hj) t  bj) (15)
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The gradient of this payo¤ with respect to t is   (s+ hj)   (hi + ) + (1 +
)(s+ hj) and independent of t. Accordingly, the optimal choice is a corner
solution. S chooses t = r (i.e., the largest feasible tax rate) if (s+hj) > hi+
and t = 0 if (s + hj) < hi + , which reduces to the condition for 
in the proposition. Finally, for (s + hj) = hi +  both t = r (with the
respective equilibrium of the subgame as in (i)) and t = r (with the respective
equilibrium as in (ii)) yield the same payo¤ for S and this payo¤ is higher
than from any choice t 2 (0; r).
Intuitively, given the sequential structure of the tax decision, the mobile
capital will always leave S for any t > 0, and for t = 0, whether the cap-
ital locates to S or H1 (with p1 = 0) is payo¤-irrelevant. Due to the lack
of competition for the mobile capital segment, the active tax haven earns
the monopoly prot from the entire share of nancial capital that is mobile
between S and Hi. It chooses pi = t as this ensures maximum prot for the
tax haven Hi which is active. With Ss choice of t not a¤ecting the nal
destination of the mobile capital segment, S chooses t = r only if  is su¢ -
ciently high. The condition for  to be su¢ ciently high is also intuitive. A
high tax is more benecial for the country if its equilibrium tax base is large
(i.e., s+ hj is large), and if (hi + ), which is the base on which the country
as a whole loses the fees to the tax haven, is small.
If none of the tax havens is active Suppose S has deactivated both
havens and nancial capital can only remain in S: Accordingly, all capital
remains in country S, the country has to pay b1 and b2, and can charge any
tax rate t 2 [0; r]. The payo¤ function of S becomes
1  t+ (1 + ) (t  b1   b2) (16)
and this payo¤ reaches a maximum equal to 1 + r   (1 + )(b1 + b2) for
t = r.
Proposition 3 If both tax havens are deactivated, then S chooses t = r and
has a payo¤ 1;2s = 1 + r   (1 + )(b1 + b2): The payo¤s of the tax havens




4 Equilibrium in Phase 1
In what follows we focus on the case in which the shadow price of public
funds is su¢ ciently high to make a high-tax strategy always preferable for
S. We rst show that S cannot expect to gain from deactivating just one
tax haven, assuming equilibrium play in Phase 2. We then consider the
cost and benet of deactivating both tax havens for the sequential regime
and the regime with simultaneous joint o¤ers. This comparison leads to our
main results: An equilibrium with simultaneous joint o¤ers exists, whereas
sequential o¤ers are never protable for S.
4.1 Deactivation of only one tax haven
Consider rst the deactivation of one tax haven compared to both tax havens
being active. Deactivation yields an increase in prots for the active tax
haven for any given t > 0. The remaining haven faces no further competition
from other tax havens. If only H1 remains active, an optimal reply for any
given t 2 (0; r] is p1 = t, which yields a payo¤ of (h1 + )t, rather than
the payo¤ h1t in the default state. Hence, the prot increase is larger if the
fully mobile share of capital is larger. If only H2 remains active, its payo¤
increases from [h2 + ]t h1h1+ to (h2 + )t. This increase is also higher for a
higher , but lower for a smaller h1. Intuitively, a larger h1 makes haven
H1 less aggressive in the competition. Hence, there is less to gain for H2
from removing its competitor H1 if h1 is larger. Note also that monopoly
prots for a tax haven need not be larger than the aggregate prots in the
case where both havens are active. Deactivation of a tax haven Hi shifts
the share hi of capital away from the tax havens, which is a payo¤-reducing
e¤ect. However, removal of competition between tax havens also increases
equilibrium user fees in the remaining tax haven , which increases the payo¤
of the active haven.
For S, deactivating one tax haven has several e¤ects. We analyze these
along the lines of e¤ects on net capital income of residents and on net tax
revenue. If only one active tax haven remains, the level of gross capital
remaining in S increases by the newly deactivated segment. Immobile capital
is always taxed at the rate r. Second, there is a reduction in investorsrents.
This is due to higher user fees that are charged on the mobile capital if only
one tax haven is active, compared to a situation with several competing tax
havens. Hence, with only one tax haven active, all capital (inside and outside
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S) is charged at the same rate r. Third, compared to both tax havens being
active, deactivation increases the tax revenue owing to S. However, the
country has to pay for the deactivation of one tax haven, which contributes
to a reduction of the payo¤ of country S.
We rst conrm that the deactivation of only one tax haven is dominated
by other choices for country S, and then turn to the comparison of payo¤s
from deactivation of both tax havens versus the payo¤s in the default state.
We state this claim as a proposition.
Proposition 4 Country S has a higher payo¤ if both tax havens are active
than if it deactivates only one haven.
Proof. Note that the e¤ects of the deactivation on the payo¤ of S di¤er for
the two havens if h1 6= h2, as both the level of capital that is rendered immo-
bile and the compensation needed for a successful deactivation are not the
same for both tax havens. Note further that both regimes in the deactivation
phase coincide if S makes an o¤er to only one tax haven.
Country S has a higher payo¤ from deactivating one and only one haven
Hi for a compensation of bi compared to the default state if iS  0S. This
can be rewritten
iS = (1  r) (s+ hi) + (h i + )  r (h i + )| {z }
active havens prots| {z }
net capital income







r (h2 + )

| {z }
aggregate havens prots| {z }
net capital income
+ (1 + ) rs|{z}
net tax revenue
= 0S (17)
Rearranging (17) yields the sole haven deactivation condition (SHIC):
(1 + ) [rhi   bi]| {z }
shadow value * increase in net tax revenue
  
(h1 + )
r (h2 + )| {z }
decrease in net capital income
 0 (18)
The condition (18) shows: for the deactivation of one tax haven to be prof-
itable for S, the decrease in net capital income has to be compensated by
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an increase in net tax revenue. As 
(h1+)
r (h2 + ) and  is always positive,
the level of compensation o¤ered and paid to the deactivated haven plays
an important role in this condition. The minimum possible compensation,
which just compensates the tax haven for its loss in prots, as in Lemma 1
for t = r can be inserted for bi, which transforms (SHIC) into
  
(h1+)











r (h2 + )  0 when deactivating H2
Thus, the condition SHIC is never fullled and S will never deactivate only
one tax haven.
Intuitively, there are several e¤ects that can be distinguished. Consider,
for instance, a deactivation of H1. First, in the regime with only one tax
haven active, all nancial capital is charged at the same rate r. Com-
pared to the default state with two active tax havens, capital owners lose

(h1+)
r (h2 + ) in additional fees that are paid to tax havens. Taken in
isolation, this constitutes a decrease in national welfare of S. Second, the
deactivation of H1 leads to an increase in total tax revenue for S by h1r as
more capital is immobile. Third, if the country S chooses to deactivate H1,
it makes the smallest compensation o¤er that H1 is willing to accept. This
smallest o¤er is equal to H1s payo¤ in the default state, which is equal to
h1r. The increase in tax receipts and the payment to H1, hence, just can-
cel out. Overall, country S just loses 
(h1+)
r (h2 + ) if it deactivates H1.
Further, should S deactivate the smaller tax haven H2 instead of H1, this
entails a further decrease in net tax revenue as the minimal compensation
that the haven would be willing to accept is larger than the increase in total
tax revenue. Condition (18) never holds. Therefore, there is no equilibrium
outcome in which S compensates only one haven, regardless of the size of s;
h1 and h2.
4.2 Deactivation of all tax havens
The result in Proposition 4 reduces the problem to possible equilibria with
deactivation of both, or none of the tax havens. We turn to this comparison
now. Again, the problem is whether the compensations required are su¢ -
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ciently low for making the deactivation of both tax havens attractive for S.
We rst derive a condition describing the maximum that S is willing to pay.
Proposition 5 The country S is better-o¤ than in the default state if it
deactivates both tax havens provided that the sum of compensations fullls
the condition
b1 + b2 < rh1 +

h1 +  (h1 + )
(h1 + ) (1 + )

(h2 + ) r. (19)
Proof. Country S makes deactivation o¤ers only if its payo¤ 1;2S after de-
activation is at least as high as its default payo¤ 0S. This condition can be
written explicitly as
1;2S = 1  r + (1 + ) [r   b1   b2] (20)
> 1  rs  h1r + h1
(h1 + )






r (h2 + )| {z }
decrease in net capital income
 (1 + ) [r (h1 + h2 + )  b1   b2]| {z }
increase in net tax revenue
(21)
This can be solved for b1 and b2:
b1 + b2  rh1 + h1
(h1 + )





(h2 + ) r (22)
Intuitively, condition (21) demonstrates that, for the deactivation of both
havens to be benecial for S, the decrease in net capital income must be
compensated by a su¢ cient increase in net tax revenue. If both tax havens
are inactive, all capital is charged at the same rate t = r. By rearranging (20),
a condition for the deactivation of both havens to be benecial is derived. For
this condition to hold, the o¤ered bids cannot exceed a certain threshold. The
sum of possible bids needs to be always higher than the sum of the havens
expected prots in the default scenario, which never exceeds r(h1 + h2 + ).
The upper bound for the sum of possible bids is a function of the shadow
price of public funds. The higher ; the nearer the possible bid level to r(h1+
h2+). This is intuitive, as an increase in  corresponds to a higher need for
tax revenue, which then allows for higher bids to achieve the deactivation of
the havens and thus eliminate the competition for mobile capital.
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5 Deactivation equilibrium
We have now shown that it is never an equilibrium for S to deactivate just
one tax haven. Further, Proposition 5 characterizes a maximum compensa-
tion that S is willing to pay in order to deactivate both tax havens. The
compensation that is needed in order to induce the two tax havens to close
down is, however, a function of the deactivation regime. We show in this
section that the compensation that would be needed in total to deactivate
both tax havens exceeds the willingness of S to pay in one of the two regimes:
only with simultaneous joint o¤ers may the deactivation of the tax havens be
benecial. Country S can o¤er simultaneous joint o¤ers or sequential o¤ers.
Subsequently we consider the two types of deactivation processes one after
the other.
5.1 Simultaneous joint o¤ers
First we consider a deactivation process in which S makes a simultaneous
joint o¤er (b1; b2) to the two tax havens. The following result holds:
Proposition 6 If S can make a simultaneous joint o¤er (b1; b2), then a
subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which both tax havens are deactivated,
with payo¤s
1;21 = b1 = h1r (23)
1;22 = b2 =
h1
(h1 + )
r (h2 + ) (24)
and





r (h2 + )

. (25)
Proof. This regimes distinctive feature lies in the conditionality of the o¤ers
on the actions of the other haven, as each haven only receives a compensation
when both accept the o¤ers.
Suppose S makes a simultaneous joint o¤er (b1; b2). Figure 1 summarizes
the payo¤s for the four subgames, assuming equilibrium play in the respective
subgames that are reached, depending on the decision of the havens to either
accept or reject the o¤er of S.
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Haven 2
Haven 1 Accept Reject
Accept b1; b2 h1r; h1h1+ r (h2 + )
Reject h1r; h1h1+ r (h2 + ) h1r;
h1
h1+
r (h2 + )
Figure 1: Payo¤ matrix for the case of simultaneous joint o¤ers
This uses t = r and the expected prots stated in Lemma 1 for the
competition phase subgame with both tax havens being active. In each of
the four cases, the rst entry corresponds to the payo¤ of H1 and the second
to the payo¤ of H2. The tax havens receive b1 and b2, respectively, if both
accept the o¤er, and they receive the payo¤s of the default situation of two
active havens if one or both of them reject the o¤er. Joint acceptance is,
hence, an equilibrium choice if bi  E(i) for both i = 1; 2. Moreover, the
smallest amounts b1 and b2 for which joint acceptances are optimal mutual
replies by the tax havens are bi = E(i) for both i = 1; 2. These bids fulll
conditions (23) and (24) in Proposition 6 and, together with deactivation of
both havens, yield (25). This payo¤ exceeds 0S as in (6), as can be seen
from comparing E(S) in (6) and (25). (The comparison boils down to
(++h1)
(h1+)
> 1, which is true.)
Proposition 6 is one of the main results in this paper. It shows that S can
protably deactivate all tax havens, provided that it can make a simultaneous
joint o¤er to all tax havens. We will later compare this o¤er regime with the
sequential o¤er regime and nd that the simultaneous joint o¤er regime is
the only regime that allows for a deactivation of tax havens that is benecial
for S.
Intuitively, if S can make a simultaneous joint o¤er, the tax havens un-
derstand that they will never become the only active tax haven. Either both
give up their tax haven business, or both stay active. Accordingly, it is opti-
mal for them if they both accept the o¤er provided that the o¤er is at least
as attractive for them as the default situation, but they should reject any
lower o¤er. Moreover, if country S anticipates this behavior, it will not make
an o¤er that exceeds the smallest o¤er which both tax havens are willing to
accept.
Note that the equilibrium in Proposition 6 is not unique, due to the
coordination problem between the two tax havens. The simultaneous joint
o¤ers lead to payments and deactivation of both tax havens only if both tax
havens accept the o¤er. Consider, for instance, o¤ers (b1; b2) with b1 > h1r
and b2 > h1h1+ r (h2 + ). Although it would be benecial for H1 and H2 to
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accept the o¤ers, there is also an equilibrium in which both reject the o¤ers.
If tax haven H1 expects H2 to reject the o¤er (for whatever reason), then H1
is indi¤erent regarding whether to accept or reject the o¤er, because both
choices lead to the same outcome (see Figure 1). The same logic applies for
H2, rationalizing H2s choice to reject the o¤er. Hence, rejecting the o¤ers
constitute mutually optimal replies.
Note further that this multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes could be used
by the tax havens to leverage up their equilibrium payo¤s. For instance,
if S expects the tax havens to end up in this rejection equilibrium for all
o¤ers (b1; b2) with b1 < h1r + and b2 < h1h1+ r (h2 + ) +, but with both
accepting the o¤ers for b1  h1r + and b2  h1h1+ r (h2 + ) + ; this can
support equilibria in which country S has to pay an additional 2 compared
to the minimum o¤ers that are accepted in the equilibrium in Proposition 6.
These equilibria, which are based on coordination failure are, however,
not robust. They rely on Hi being indi¤erent regarding whether to accept or
to reject ifHi thinks thatHj will reject. Country S can break this indi¤erence
if it can o¤er a menu that o¤ers Hi also a very small payment for the case
in which Hi accepts but Hj rejects the o¤er.
5.2 Independent sequential o¤ers
Rather than a once-and-for-all simultaneous joint o¤er, what the OECD pur-
sues with its Harmful Tax Practices Initiative is a more sequential process in
which bilateral information exchange agreements are sequentially negotiated
and signed between tax havens and non-tax-haven countries. Consider there-
fore the sequential deactivation regime, where S rst approaches one haven
Hi with a bid bi for deactivation and then can make a bid bj to the other tax
haven Hj, where it can adjust this bid taking into consideration whether the
previous bid to Hi was accepted or not.
Proposition 7 If S can make sequential independent o¤ers, the sum of com-
pensations needed to deactivate both tax havens is smaller if the tax haven
with more loyal capital (with higher hi) is compensated rst. Overall, the
combination of (bi; bj(:)) that would make both havens accept the o¤ers ex-
ceeds country Ss willingness to pay.
Proof. Using backward induction, we derive the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of this o¤er regime. Assume that S rst makes an o¤er bi to Hi, and
then, depending on the outcome, possibly an o¤er bj(:) to Hj.
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Note that no o¤er bj is made if bi was not accepted, as this would lead
to the deactivation of one tax haven only, and it was shown in Proposition
4 that it is not protable for S to deactivate only one tax haven. Suppose
therefore that Hi has accepted the o¤er bi, and consider the behavior of Hj
for a given bj(:), given that Hi is deactivated. Given that Hj is the only
tax haven that is possibly active, the o¤er is acceptable for Hj if and only if
bj(:)  (hj+)r. If S makes such an o¤er, it chooses the smallest acceptable
o¤er, bj(:) = (hj + )r.
Turn now to the compensation o¤er bi. As a consequence of Proposition
4, Hi anticipates that S will never o¤er a deactivation bid to Hj if Hi rejects
the o¤er bi. Thus, the optimal strategy of Hi is:
Reject if bi < 0i
Accept if bi  0i
Accordingly, S will either make a bid bi = 0i or no bid at all.
The lowest feasible sum of bids that deactivates both tax havens, hence,
is





Country S makes these sequential o¤ers if the sum of these o¤ers fullls
inequality (19) in Proposition 5.
Before we check whether (19) can be fullled for successful sequential
o¤ers, note that 01 + 
1
2  02 + 21. This can be seen by inserting 12 =




2 for t = r as in Lemma 1 into this
inequality, which becomes equivalent to the condition h1  h2. Accordingly,
if S makes an o¤er, the rst o¤er is made to tax haven H1.
Using the condition (19) from Proposition 5, S makes an o¤er if
h1r + h2r + r  rh1 +

h1 +  (h1 + )
(h1 + ) (1 + )

(h2 + ) r
or, equivalently,
1  1  
(h1 + ) (1 + )
,
and this condition can never be fullled for  > 0.
The deactivation of both tax havens is expensive. Intuitively, the se-
quential procedure has a major drawback: once the rst tax haven has been
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deactivated, this considerably benets the tax haven that remains. This re-
maining tax haven makes a much larger prot than in the default regime in
which the tax havens compete, since it has lost its main competitor. Coun-
try S therefore has to pay a very high price for deactivating the remaining
tax haven monopoly. This competition e¤ect of the sequential nature of the
squeeze-out is one of the key results of the paper. It provides a potentially
important lesson for the ongoing process by which the OECD tries to close
down one tax haven after another. While the closing down of single tax
havens is not very expensive initially, compensating further tax havens to
close down their operation becomes increasingly costly: due to the reduced
competition, the tax havensbusiness becomes more protable, and this in-
creases the compensation needed.
If -for whatever reason- the OECD initiative has to follow a sequential
path, Proposition 7 highlights an important second-best result: it is supe-
rior to start this sequential process by making an o¤er to the strongest tax
haven(s) rst (i.e., the one with the largest hi) and then move on to the
smaller tax havens later. This is also not necessarily in line with observed
behavior in the Harmful Tax Practices Initiative.
5.3 Comparing o¤er regimes
We can also compare the equilibrium outcomes for the two o¤er regimes.
Proposition 8 Comparing the least-cost o¤ers in the two o¤er regimes by
which S can deactivate all tax havens, the least-cost simultaneous joint o¤er
is less cost for S than the least-costly sequential independent o¤ers.
The result in Proposition 8 follows directly from a comparison of Propo-
sitions 6 and 7: the necessary deactivation payments in the sequential o¤ers
regime exceed the benets of deactivation, but the payments in the simulta-
neous joint o¤er regime do not. Hence, the sum of compensations is lower in
the simultaneous joint o¤er regime than in the sequential regime.
Intuitively, in the case of simultaneous joint o¤ers, none of the tax havens
can hope to become the only active tax haven in the competition phase.
When deciding about staying active, they compare the compensation o¤ered
to their payo¤ in a situation in which they compete with other tax havens.
In the sequential regime, the possibility of becoming a monopoly tax haven
plays an important role. The second tax haven that is approached is the
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monopoly tax haven in this case. Therefore, considerably more must be
o¤ered to this tax haven to make it attractive to become inactive.
To illustrate the potential magnitude of the e¤ect, consider, for instance,
h1 = h2 = 0. In this case, if both tax havens are active, they earn zero
payo¤s, as all existing capital perceives the two havens as perfect substitutes
in a Bertrand game. In the equilibrium in Proposition 6, the country S can
close down both tax havens by making joint simultaneous o¤ers that sum up
to b1 + b2 = 0 + 0 = 0. In the sequential game, the equilibrium payment
o¤ers are bi + bj(:) = 0 + r.
6 Conclusions
This paper considers the problem of how to deactivate tax havens in a world
with multiple tax havens. The ght against tax havens has many aspects
that we did not address here. For instance, we disregarded the problem of
coordinated action among the non-tax-haven countries, and rather consid-
ered one big non-haven country or player such as the OECD, that is able
to internalize the benets and cost of a deactivation initiative such as the
Harmful Tax Practices Initiative.
Our analysis highlights an important issue that is largely neglected in
the current ght against tax havens: Once this ght shows some initial suc-
cess, that is, once some of the tax havens have successfully been approached
and convinced to close down their operations, this will change the nature of
competition among the tax havens that remain active. Competition between
these tax havens will relax, due to the exit of some of their competitors. The
rents they earn from their "services" to nancial capital, and other tax haven
"services" more generally, increase as the number of tax havens is reduced.
This e¤ect has a number of relevant implications.
First, it reveals that a sequential ght against tax havens is easier in its
initial phase. The initial series of successes in the ght against tax havens
clouds the size of the true problem. It should not make us condent as
regards the likelihood of nal success. The more tax havens have been closed
down, the harder it will be to convince the remaining tax havens to give up
their tax haven business. It may actually become excessively expensive to
close down the last few tax havens, as these tax havens will earn very high
monopoly rents.
Second, closing down just a few tax havens leads to a situation that is
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potentially worse (from a welfare point of view of the OECD countries) than
a situation with a large number of tax havens. If many tax havens o¤er their
services and compete for capital, their fees will be low. Tax revenues will also
be low, but at least the capital (and its returns) remains with its owners in
the OECD countries. If a major share of tax havens have been closed down
and only a limited number of tax havens are still active, competition between
them will be reduced. Hence, fees for tax-sheltering services are high in the
equilibrium outcome. Tax revenue in OECD countries may still be low, but
a large share of the returns of capital is taken away from its owners and
transferred to the tax havens (as fees).
Third, the analysis suggests that, if it comes to ghting tax havens, a
coordinated and conditional "big-bang" policy initiative which tries to form a
simultaneous multilateral agreement between all non-tax-haven countries and
all tax-havens is superior (less expensive) compared to a sequential process
of closing down one tax haven after another.
Fourth, if a "big-bang" policy is not feasible and only a sequential policy
is possible, then the order matters for the cost of a sequential policy. Our
analysis suggests that a sequential policy should address those tax havens
rst which are already particularly successful in the initial situation with
competition between tax havens.
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